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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE AND THE SUPREME
COURT: A MOVE BACK?
James A. White was convicted of certain narcotics violations under
the United States Code' in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.2 The government's case
was supported in large part by evidence obtained with the use of a
"bugged" informant. By placing a small transistorized kel set transmitter
under the clothing of one Harvey Jackson, a police informant, govern-
ment agents were able to monitor with a radio receiver some of White's
incriminating conversations with Jackson.
On eight separate occasions during the months of December 1965
and early January 1966 in Chicago, informant Jackson, under the di-
rection of government agents who had obtained no court order or war-
rant, transacted business with White for the purchase of heroin while
a transmitter was concealed on his person.3  On four occasions the
transactions took place at Jackson's home while, in a car parked out-
side, government agent Robert DeFauw listened in on a radio receiver.
On these occasions a second agent was concealed with Jackson's consent
in a kitchen closet and also overheard the conversations. On four
other occasions incriminating conversations were transmitted over agent
DeFauw's car radio receiver-once from a restaurant, once from White's
home, and twice from Jackson's car.
Informant Jackson never appeared in court and never testified him-
self as to the content of his conversations with White. The defense ob-
1. 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) (1964 ed.) and 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964 ed.). These
laws were recently repealed: see 26 U.S.C. § 4705(9) and 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1970
ed.).
2. The case was heard in the Chicago courtroom of the Honorable Judge Julius
J. Hoffman.
3. White argued, inter alia, that Jackson's consent to the use of the trans-
mitter was not "voluntary," but neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court
considered this issue. The circuit court felt that since in their view the consent of
either party to a conversation did not legitimize the presence of a third ear, the
issue of Jackson's consent need not be determined. United States v. White, 405 F.2d
838, 844 n.5 (7th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court, although finally deciding that
one participant's consent would allow a third person to listen in, declined to con-
sider the issue of the voluntariness of Jackson's consent "[b]ecause the court be-
low did not reach the issue." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 n.1 (1971).
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jected to the introduction of the oral testimony of the government agents
who had heard the conversations by means of eavesdropping. The de-
fense claimed that the transmission was an unreasonable search and
seizure of White's private conversation within the meaning of the fourth
amendment and, as such, should be suppressed. The trial court over-
ruled the objections and White was convicted and sentenced to 25 years
as a second offender. On review by a three judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the conviction was re-
versed. The government petitioned for and was granted a rehearing
en banc in front of the same court, and the majority of the full court
affirmed the panel's decision and reversed the conviction,4 relying prin-
cipally on the landmark 1969 Supreme Court decision of Katz v. United
States.5 The majority felt that the language of Katz had undermined
the reasoning of an earlier Supreme Court decision in On Lee v. United
States,6 which had upheld the use of a bugged informant on facts identi-
cal to those presented in White. The Supreme Court in a plurality
opinion 7 reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the conviction,
holding that Katz v. United States, which extended fourth amendment
protections to the seizure of any conversation which the speaker has a
justifiable right to expect to be private, does not impose a warrant re-
quirement on electronic eavesdropping where one party to the conversa-
tion has consented to having the conversation simultaneously transmitted
to a third person. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 8
4. United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969).
5. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
7. Justice White wrote the plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart and Blackmun joined. Justices Black and Brennan wrote
separate concurring opinions, the latter concurring in the result only on procedural
grounds. Justices Douglas, Harlan, and Marshall dissented.
8. The plurality also substantiated their decision in White on an alternative,
procedural ground. In Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), the Court
held that, analyzing the criteria developed by it in determining whether a new in-
terpretation of the constitution should be applied retroactively, the principles enun-
ciated in Katz should only have prospective effect. Thus since the eavesdropping
in White occurred prior to the decision in Katz, the latter case's new interpretation
of the fourth amendment would not apply to White in any event. The dissenting
Justices in White, Douglas, Harlan, and Marshall, also took issue with the validity of
the Desist decision, as did concurring Justice Black, and would apply Katz regardless.
Justice Brennan concurred solely on the basis of his agreement with the application
of Desist.
The criteria used by the Court in determining the retroactivity of a decision in
the area of criminal procedure have come to be summarized as: "(a) the purpose
to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforce-
ment authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
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The purpose of this note is threefold. It will begin by explaining the
constitutional issues presented by electronic eavesdropping and their his-
torical development. There will then be a determination of the extent
to which the White case has clarified the limits of constitutional protec-
tion in the electronic eavesdropping area. The note will conclude by
demonstrating how White indicates a check in the recent trend of the
High Court toward enlarging the scope of fourth amendment protection
in the area of the seizure of conversation through the employment of
electronic devices.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISSUES9
The earliest view of the Supreme Court regarding the use of electronic
eavesdropping devices was embodied in Olmstead v. United States,10
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 297 (1967). See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). For
thorough discussions on the issue of retroactivity see generally Bender, The Retro-
active Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 650 (1962); Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective
Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201 (1965); Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective
Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1960); Mishkin, The Supreme Court 1964
Term-Foreward: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time
and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965); Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts":
Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631 (1967); Schwartz,
Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U.
CH. L. REV. 719 (1966); Spruill, The Effect of an Overruling Decision, 18 N.C.L.
REV. 199 (1940); Note, Retroactivity of Criminal Procedure Decisions, 55 IowA
L. REV. 1309 (1970); Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Ap-
plication in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962).
9. For other perspectives on the history of electronic eavesdropping and wire-
tapping see HALL, KAMISAR, LAFAVE, ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 334-387
(3rd ed. 1969); Dash, Katz-Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATHOLIC U.L.
REV. 296 (1968); Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eaves-
dropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with the Consent of a Participant in a Con-
versation, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 189 (1968); King, Electronic Surveillance and Con-
stitutional Rights: Some Recent Developments and Observations, 33 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 240 (1964); Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth
Amendment, 1968 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 133; Scoular, Wiretapping and
Eavesdropping Constitutional Development from Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. Louis L.J.
513 (1968); Sullivan, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: A Review of the Current
Law, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1966); Comment, Electronic Surveillance, 17 BAYLOR
L. REV. 338 (1965); Comment, Eavesdropping, Informers, and the Right of Privacy:
A Judicial Tightrope, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 975 (1967); Comment, Eavesdropping and
the Constitution: A Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment Framework, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 378 (1965); 32 ALBANY L. REV. 455 (1968); 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 257 (1968);
34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 223 (1968); 82 HARV. L. REV. 187 (1968); 46 TEXAS L. REV.
973 (1968); and for the unique critical view of an intellectual Canadian, see Ryan,
The United States Electronic Eavesdrop Cases, 19 U. TORONTO L.J. 68 (1969).
10. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
[Vol. XXI
CASE NOTES
where evidence secured through wiretapping was used to convict peti-
tioners of violation of the National Prohibition Act. The majority con-
sidered conversation too intangible to be within the ambit of the fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.1 '
The amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things-the person,
the house, his papers, or his effects. The description of the warrant necessary to
make the proceeding lawful is that it must specify the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized ... 12
The Court distinguished between seizure without a warrant of a letter
or package in the mails, which it had ruled was improper and subject to
the exclusionary rule in Ex parte Jackson,'5 and seizure of a conversation
over telephone lines, which it felt did not violate the fourth amendment.
By further noting that the evidence was obtained "by use of the
sense of hearing" without any "entry of the houses or offices of the de-
fendants,"' 4 the majority laid the groundwork for what was later re-
ferred to as the "physical trespass" doctrine or "physical intrusion" doc-
trine of the seizure of intangibles. The decision thus held not only
that mere words themselves could not be seized within the true meaning
of the fourth amendment, but that in any event, some actual physical
trespass was required to bring the amendment into play in such circum-
stances. In Olmstead the seizure of petitioners' conversation was not
accompanied by any physical intrustion into their property, but merely
by a trespass on the telephone lines, which are no more a part of some-
one's house or office "than are the highways along which they are
stretched."' 5
The idea of the need for a "physical trespass" was reaffirmed later in
11. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The remedy of the exclusionary rule whereby evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment could be held inadmissible at trial had already become firmly
established at this time in the Federal courts. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914). See also Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298 (1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Today, of
course, the exclusionary rule has been held to be a requirement in the state courts
also in order to provide an effective remedy for violations of fourth amendment
search and seizure limitations. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12. Supra note 10, at 464.
13. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
14. Supra note 10, at 464.
15. Supra note 10, at 465.
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Goldman v. United States.16 There the Court found no physical intru-
sion, and as a result no warrant requirement, when federal officers picked
up the conversation inside petitioner's office by merely placing a detecta-
phone against the wall of an adjoining office. By disposing of the case
in this manner, the majority never provided itself with the opportunity
of re-evaluating the issue of whether, even in the face of a trespass,
words could properly be seized within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment. The Court also rejected a contention that the seizure of peti-
tioner's conversation was a violation of § 605 of the Federal Communi-
cations Act,17 enacted in 1934 subsequent to Olmstead. Although peti-
tioner was speaking into a telephone when his words were heard, there
was no "interception" of the transmission of the words as they traveled
over the telephone itself, which is what the majority felt the Act was
designed to prohibit. 18
The same type of analysis was used by the majority of the Court to
dispose of petitioner's contentions in On Lee v. United States,19 a case of
special importance to us because of its factual equivalency to White.
In On Lee an old acquaintance-turned-informer named Chin Poy, while
wired for sound with an electronic transmitter, engaged On Lee in an
incriminating conversation in the latter's laundry while a narcotics agent
monitored the conversation outside. The narcotics agent, and not Chin
Poy, testified in court. The majority determined:
* . . [Pletitioner cannot raise the undecided question [of whether the fourth amend-
ment would prohibit the seizure of words in the face of a physical trespass], for here
no trespass was committed. Chin Poy entered a place of business with the consent,
if not by the implied invitation, of the petitioner. 20
The majority also rejected contentions "that Chin Poy's subsequent 'un-
lawful conduct' vitiated the consent and rendered his entry a trespass
ab initio."'21 The Court further rejected arguments "that Chin Poy's
entrance was a trespass because consent to his entry was obtained by
16. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
17. Communications Act of 1934 § 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970 ed.).
18. Id., § 3(a) provides: ". . . No person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any
person .... ." § 605 of the 1934 Act has since been superceded by Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 2510 et seq., 18
U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1968), (1970 ed.), discussed infra n.45, 64.
19. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
20. Id. at 751-52.
21. Id. at 752.
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fraud; ' 22 and, on the authority of Goldstein v. United States23-Goldman's
companion case-that there was a violation of § 605 of the Federal
Communications Act. 24  The four separate dissenting opinions, 25 how-
ever, pointed to the growing dissatisfaction with the established concept
of fourth amendment protection in this area. In the words of Justice
Douglas, who had concurred with the majority in Goldman a decade
earlier, one could "now more fully appreciate the vice of the practices
spawned by Olmstead and Goldman.' '26
Nine years later, a unanimous Court was ready to assert that some
constitutional protection against electronic eavesdropping did exist.27
Without reversing any previous decisions, the Court in Silverman v.
United States,28 held that driving a spiked microphone through a party
wall and into a heating duct serving petitioner's house, thereby convert-
ing the duct into a conductor of sound capable of picking up conversa-
tion inside the house, was sufficient trespass to bring the fourth amend-
ment into play regardless of
...whether or not there was a technical trespass under the local property law re-
lating to party walls. Inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measur-
able in terms of ancient niceties of tort or real property law.2 9
Despite such language, the majority30 felt justified in distinguishing Sil-
verman from Goldman, where the listening device was only placed up
against the party wall.31 The Court, while thus reaffirming and devel-
22. Id.
23. 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
24. Communications Act of 1934 § 605, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970 ed.).
25. Justices Burton, Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas dissented.
26. Supra n. 19, at 762.
27. The language of the Court seven years earlier in Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128 (1954), where the police had installed a microphone in the bedroom
of petitioner's home, also pointed to the fact that the fourth amendment does pro-
hibit the unreasonable seizure of intangibles. The conviction based on the fruits
of the misconduct was affirmed, however, since at that time the majority felt that
the exclusionary rule did not extend to the states.
28. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
29. Id. at 511.
30. Justice Douglas filed a separate concurring opinion in which he declined to
condition fourth amendment rights in any way on the absence or presence of a physi-
cal trespass: "The depth of the penetration of the electronic device--even the
degree of its remoteness from the inside of the house-is not the measure of the
injury. . . . Our concern should not be with the trivialities of the local law of
trespass, as the opinion of the Court indicates. But neither should the command of
the Fourth Amendment be limited by nice distinctions turning on the kind of elec-
tronic equipment employed. Rather our sole concern should be with whether the
privacy of the home was invaded." Id. at 513.
31. For an illustration of how the courts struggled with and interpreted the
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
oping its physical trespass theory, did finally assert by virtue of its de-
cision, although not expressly in the opinion itself, that words could be
seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The decision also
changed the terminology of the physical trespass theory by focusing
on "the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area. "82
If any skeptic was still left in doubt as to the validity of apply-
ing fourth amendment safeguards and the exclusionary rule to "mere
words" after Silverman, his concern was resolved by an explicit state-
ment of the Court in Wong Sun v. United States.8  Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, writing for the majority, clearly articulated that Silverman had nec-
essarily implied that the unwarranted seizure of a person's private con-
versation was subject to fourth amendment safeguards, at least, that is,
if the seizure was accompanied by a physical trespass or an "actual in-
trusion into a constitutionally protected area."'8 4  But the validity of this
latter requirement was soon to be unmistakably denounced in the land-
mark decision of Katz v. United States.35
physical trespass theory without applying the "niceties of . . . real property law,"
see Clinton v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963), where the court
found that a mechanical listening device "stuck in" a party wall like a thumb tack,
but not "driven into" it, did not amount to a trespass according to the criteria laid
out in Silverman and Goldman. The Supreme Court reversed per curiam in
Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964). See also Cullins v. Wainwright, 328
F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964), where, in a habeas
corpus proceeding, the contents of a conversation monitored by the dropping of a
mike through the roof of a house was held inadmissible.
32. Supra note 28, at 512. The problem of defining a "constitutionally pro-
tected area" also remained. In Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), where
the conversation between petitioner and his brother in a jail visiting room was
monitored and used as evidence, the Court held that ". . . jail shares none of the
attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room."
Id. at 143. In United States v. Stone, 232 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Tex. 1964), a
telephone booth was held to be a constitutionally protected area. Contra, United
States v. Borgese, 235 F. Supp. 286 (S.D. N.Y. 1964), vacated, 372 F.2d 950
(2nd Cir. 1967).
33. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
34. "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible
materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion. It
follows from our holding in Silverman v. United States . . . that the Fourth
Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as
against the more traditional seizure of 'papers and effects.' . . . Thus, verbal evi-
dence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized
arrest as the officers' action in the present case is no less the 'fruit' of official ille-
gality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion."
Id. at 485.
35. Supra note 5. In Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), decided
earlier the same year, the high court found that placing a recorder in petitioner's
[Vol. XXI
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In the Katz case, a majority of the Court3 6 found that the F.B.I.'s
actions in attaching an electronic device to the outside of a public tele-
hone booth, thus enabling them to hear and record petitioner's telephone
conversation, without first obtaining a warrant, violated the fourth amend-
ment, despite the fact that the device in no way physically penetrated
the structure. Olmstead and Goldman were found to be ". . . so eroded
by . . .subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated
can no longer be regarded as controlling. '3 7
Not content with overruling Olmstead and Goldman, the Court also
questioned the Silverman criteria, finding that a discussion of whether or
not a public phone booth is a constitutionally protected area
• ..deflects attention from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. [citations omitted].3 8
Petitioner had a right to exclude the "uninvited ear" from his conversa-
tion and was entitled to assume that the phone booth would effect this
exclusion. A majority of the Court thus felt that the violation of a per-
son's fourth amendment rights is contingent more upon his justifiable
expectation of privacy, rather than upon any physical intrusion into any
defined area where he may happen to be at the time.
Prior to this time, an additional set of criteria was developing in those
cases where one of the parties to a conversation was working with the
authorities and either consented to a monitoring of the conversation by
office violated the fourth amendment because the New York statute under which the
eavesdrop was authorized [N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a (McKinney 1958)] was
unconstitutional on its face. The Court felt that since the statute allowed a court-
ordered eavesdrop on the showing of reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of
crime might thus be obtained, with no requirement for particularity as to what
specific crime was being investigated or what conversations were to be seized, it
authorized an intrusion into a constitutionally protected area without meeting fourth
amendment standards for a search and seizure. Because the majority opinion struck
down the statute in its entirety, including its provisions for wiretapping under the
same criteria, without a discussion of any physical trespass requirement, the case was
read by many, including concurring Justice Douglas and dissenting Justice Black,
as overruling Olmstead sub silentio. But since the facts of the case indicated
that the recorder was installed by means of a physical invasion into petitioner's
office, the Olmstead-Goldman-Silverman physical trespass distinction could still
have been considered viable.
36. Justice Black dissented adhering to the Olmstead proposition that words
are too intangible to be seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 389
U.S. at 364-374.
37. Supra note 5, at 353.
38. Supra note 5, at 351.
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a third person, as in On Lee and White, or recorded the conversation
himself, or merely later disclosed the contents of the conversation without
the aid of any electronic device. In On Lee, as we have noted, the
majority based its decision principally on the need for a physical tres-
pass. Finding none, the Court held that the third party monitoring of
the conversation between On Lee and agent Chin Poy raised no fourth
amendment issue.
39
In Lopez v. United States,40 however, the Court suggested another
factor which could properly be taken into consideration in a fact situation
like that presented in On Lee (or White). Here, an internal revenue
agent, while visiting petitioner's office to discuss his failure to pay certain
excise taxes, transcribed on a pocket wire recorder his conversation with
the petitioner in which the latter offered him a bribe.4 1 The Court, at
first finding that the agent had petitioner's consent to enter the office and
was therefore not guilty of any unlawful invasion thereof, noted also that
the recording of the conversation was really not an "eavesdrop" at all,
but rather only a means by which the government was able
.. . to obtain the most reliable evidence possible of a conversation in which [its]
own agent was a participant and which that agent was fully entitled to disclose.
And the device ... was carried in and out by an agent who was there with petition-
er's assent, and it neither saw nor heard more than the agent himself. 42
This language indicates that the Court would take a different approach
toward those cases where one party to a conversation consented to work
as an informer or agent; 43 and it indicates further that there is no require-
ment for a warrant where an electronic device merely enables the gov-
ernment to obtain corroborative evidence of that which they were law-
fully hearing through their undercover agent. 44 By further likening the
39. See text supra at 7-8.
40. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
41. The agent was also carrying a small pocket transmitter, but it failed to work.
42. Supra note 40, at 439. See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Colonade
Catering Corp. v. U.S., 397 U.S. 72 (1970) where the court said that fourth amend-
ment rules apply when Congress has authorized inspection but has not provided
governing procedures; Mancusi v. De Norte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) where the court
held that fourth amendment rights apply to offices; Terry v. State of Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968) where people on streets are entitled to same protection as those in
their homes.
43. See Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1302 (1964). Evidence secured by means of a
mechanical or electronic eavesdropping device is generally held admissible regardless
of other particular factors which may be involved in the case, where it appears
that one of the parties to the overheard conversation consented to or co-operated
in its interception.
44. May not such "corroborative" evidence be attacked when the agent him-
self fails to testify, and the government seeks to proffer the recording itself or the
CASE NOTES
Lopez situation to a case where a policeman was allowed to testify about
the contents of a conversation he had heard on the extension phone
of a party to the conversation with that party's consent, 45 the majority
draws no distinction between third party participation during the conver-
sation-where the agent simultaneously transmits the conversation-or
after it-where the agent records the conversation, a distinction which
becomes important in White.
The Court has clearly held that the fourth amendment is not violated
merely because an undercover informant later divulges the contents of a
defendant's conversation to the police, where no electronic device was
employed and where the defendant consented to the informer's presence
and freely spoke with him, as in Lewis v. United States,46 or within his
ear-range, as in Hoffa v. United States.47,  This is characterized as a
mere "misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides
his wrongdoing will not reveal it."'48
This, then, is the context within which White came before the Court.
On Lee, decided nearly twenty years earlier, was factually on point, but
its authority had been put into question by the Court's gradual reap-
praisal and final outright rejection of the trespass doctrine on which the
testimony of another agent who heard either the recording or a simultaneous
transmission of the conversation? The plurality in White feels: "No different
result should obtain where, as in On Lee and the instant case, the informer dis-
appears and is unavailable at trial; for the issue of whether specified events on a
certain day violate the Fourth Amendment should not be determined by what later
happens to the informer. His unavailability at trial and proffering the testimony
of other agents may raise evidentiary problems or pose issues of prosecutorial mis-
conduct with respect to the informer's disappearance, but they do not appear
critical to deciding whether prior events invaded the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights." 401 U.S. at 753-54. For further discussion of this point see Comment,
Eavesdropping, Informers, and the Right of Privacy: A Judicial Tightrope, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 975, 982-84 (1967).
45. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957). This case was decided un-
der § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605, and indicated that
the section did not prohibit the listening in on a telephone conversation when one of
the parties consented. Cf. Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), where petitioner
did not consent and did not know that police had hooked up a party line to his phone.
See also Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
§ 2510 et seq., 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1970 ed.), which changed the federal
law on wiretapping and eavesdropping by allowing both with court approval in the
investigation of certain offenses. It is interesting to note that the legislature could
be considered to have anticipated the final ruling of the Court in White since the
statutory limitations of Title III do not apply where a party to the wire or oral
communication has consented to the interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511-2(c).
46. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
47. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
48. Id. at 302.
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decision was seemingly based. But perhaps the Lopez consent-corrobora-
tion formulation could be deemed a viable alternative theory upon which
the same result would obtain in such a case-that is, if such a theory
could be reconciled with the opinion in Katz. Because of the language
and scope of the Katz decision, based on the broad notions of a right
to privacy where one justifiably expects privacy, there existed the possi-
bility that its application would extend to situations even where there was
a consent factor involved, as in Lopez and On Lee, and that such de-
cisions might be re-evaluated in the light of Katz.49
The precise question presented in White thus became whether, accord-
ing to the criteria expounded in Katz, one could "justifiably expect" that,
in the absence of a search warrant, his conversation would be private to the
extent that it would not be simultaneously transmitted to a third party
by the other participant. Or, does one who voluntarily converses with
another properly assume the risk not only that his words will be repeated
(Lewis), or recorded (Lopez), but that they will be simultaneously trans-
mitted to some third person with the consent of the other party to the
conversation? After the Katz decision, and before the Supreme Court
decision in White, the answer to these questions remained uncertain, as
reflected by conflicting views in the lower courts. 50
THE IMPACT OF THE WHITE DECISION
Justice White, in an opinion joined by Justices Burger, Stewart, and
Blackmun, reversed the findings of the lower court and decided that
49. This was especially true in light of the Court's decision in Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), a case subsequent to Lopez with similar facts, but
where the agent recording the conversation was acting under judicial sanction.
Instead of summarily disposing of the case with a citation to Lopez, the Court pre-
sumed that the case raised important fourth amendment issues and upheld the
agent's action by virtue of the fact that the agent had received prior judicial au-
thorization. This indicated that the Lopez decision might be undergoing a re-evalua-
tion.
50. See Handsford v. United States, 390 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. per curiam, J.
Fahey dissenting), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968); Dancy v. United States,
390 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1968 J. Fahey dissenting); Long v. United States, 387 F.2d
377 (5th Cir. 1967 per curiam); Dryden v. United States, 391 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.
1968 per curiam); People v. Fiedler, 30 App. Div. 2d 476, 294 N.Y.S.2d 368
(1968 JJ. Goldman and Bastow dissenting), aff'd without opinion, 24 N.Y.2d 960,
250 N.E.2d 75 (1969). The latter cases all found On Lee viable despite Katz,
with dissents noted. Cf. United States v. Kaufer, 406 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd
per curiam 394 U.S. 458 (1969); Koran v. United States, 408 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.
1969); Holt v. United States, 404 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1968); all containing dicta
to the same effect. Contra, Doty v. United States, 416 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1969),
but rev'd on rehearing, 416 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Jones,
292 F. Supp. 1001 (D.D.C. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 433 F.2d 1176 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
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Katz does not disturb the finding in On Lee, reaffirming and relying on
the consent factor established in the Hoffa, Lewis, Lopez line of cases to
justify On Lee's continued vitality. These Justices, in terms of the prin-
ciples announced in Katz, felt that there was no "justifiable and con-
stitutionally protected expectation that a person with whom [one] is
conversing will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police
[italics mine]," 51 regardless of what one's subjective expectation of pri-
vacy may be in such a situation.
For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the agent instead of im-
mediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant [as the opinion
notes was held proper in Hoffa], either (1) simultaneously records them with elec-
tronic equipment which he is carrying on his person, Lopez v. United States
.; (2) or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversa-
tions either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring
the transmitting frequency. On Lee v. United States . . . . If the conduct and
revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade the de-
fendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a simul-
taneous recording of the same conversations made by the agent or by others from
transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose
trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks.52
Justice White thus had no difficulty in likening the On Lee-White situa-
tion to Lopez, even in view of the "privacy" criteria laid down in Katz,
since complete reliance on the trustworthiness of another was considered
to be an unjustifiable risk. The fact situation in Katz could be easily
distinguished, since no party to the conversation agreed to the eaves-
dropping, and the defendant had justifiably relied on the privacy of a
telephone booth, not on the good faith of a party to the conversation.53
The plurality opinion even pointed out language in On Lee which indi-
cated that the factor of consent was an alternative and independent
ground for the decision in that case. 54
51. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
52. Id. at 751.
53. Justice White had already clearly noted this distinction in his concurring
opinion in Katz. After asserting that Lopez and On Lee were left undisturbed by
the decision in Katz, he went on: "When one man speaks to another he takes
all the risks ordinarily inherent in so doing, including the risk that the man to
whom he speaks will make public what he has heard. The Fourth Amendment
does not protect against unreliable (or law-abiding) associates." Supra note 5, at
363, n. 1.
54. "Petitioner was talking confidentially and indiscreetly with one he trusted,
and he was overheard . . . . It would be a dubious service to the genuine liberties
protected by the Fourth Amendment to make them bedfellows with spurious liberties
improvised by farfetched analogies which would liken eavesdropping on a conversa-
tion, with the connivance of one of the parties, to an unreasonable search or
seizure. We find no violation of the Fourth Amendment here." Supra note 6, at
753-54. Note that here we are concerned with the informer's consent to allow
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The dissenting Justices, Douglas, Harlan, and Marshall, and Justice
Brennan, concurring in the result only because of Desist v. United States,55
were not as willing to reconcile consensual third party monitoring with
Katz or to analogize it to Lopez. Justice Harlan deemed the distinction
between mere recording by the agent, as in Lopez (in which he penned
the majority opinion upholding the agent's action), and transmission to
a third person a significant one in determining fourth amendment war-
rant requirements. The difference in the amount of risk the average
citizen is subjected to in these two situations forces Justice Harlan to
draw the line between them, imposing a warrant requirement where some
unknown third ear is simultaneously listening in, regardless of the con-
sent of one of the participants. He feels that the opinion he wrote in
Lopez in no way reaffirmed On Lee, and that it in fact emphasized the
absence of any third party intrusion in determining whether the "risk"
was fairly assumed by the petitioner. 58
The basis for Justice Harlan's concern in advocating the imposition
of a warrant requirement in the On Lee-White situation of simultaneous
third party monitoring is grounded in the practical effect which he feels
such judicially uncontrolled surveillance would have on the average citi-
zen.
Authority is hardly required to support the proposition that words would be mea-
sured a good deal more carefully and communication inhibited if one expected his
conversations were being transmitted and transcribed. Were third-party bugging a
prevalent practice, it might well smother that spontaneity-reflected in frivolous,
impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discourse-that liberates daily life. 57
This same social policy consideration would have Justice Douglas impose
a warrant requirement in any situation where the government seeks to
seize one's private conversation. In fact, as indicated by the first words
of his dissent, he feels that "[t]he issue in this case is clouded and
concealed by the very discussion of it in legalistic terms. . . . Electronic
surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known."5s
Since he finds electronic eavesdropping almost certain to stifle free dis-
course and lead to abuse of civil rights, he would carefully limit it and
apply the protections afforded by the fourth amendment. His concern
is carefully documented with statements made by various prominent
the conversation to be monitored. This should not be confused with the petitioner's
consent to the informer's entry, which was considered in On Lee to negate any
contention of a physical trespass on the part of the informer. See text supra, at 8.
55. Supra note 8.
56. 401 U.S. at 776.
57. Id. at 787.
58. Id. at 756.
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political figures, including, in an appendix to his dissent, memoranda
written by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, while serv-
ing as President, expressing their reservations about the utilization of
eavesdropping and wiretapping by government officials.59
Justice Marshall's brief dissent merely indicated that he finds On Lee
irreconciliable with Katz.60 Justice Brennan, concurring on procedural
grounds, 61 would not only extend the fourth amendment to the On Lee-
White situation, but, reaffirming his dissent in Lopez, he finds that case
"rationally indistinguishable" and would impose a warrant requirement
in that situation also. 62
The decision in White has thus rounded out considerably the criteria
with which to analyze most foreseeable electronic bugging situations in
determining the necessity of a fourth amendment warrant requirement.
White has also limited Katz's application to those situations where neither
party to a conversation has consented to its seizure. The result is that
now, in the absence of any statutory limitations, the police are free to
obtain the contents of a private conversation without first securing a
warrant, provided they procure the voluntary consent of one party to the
conversation, by having the conniving party: (1) Relate to them after-
wards what was spoken without the aid of any electronic device, or (2)
simultaneously record the conversation and present it to them afterwards,
or (3) simultaneously transmit the conversation to them at the time.
In those situations where none of the participants consent, the principles
enunciated in Katz must be applied to determine whether a warrant
must be secured.
This result upholds the constitutionality of that part of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,63 which excludes
consensual third party monitoring from the ambit of the Act's limita-
tions.6 4  The decision would in no way affect the constitutionality of
59. Id. at 766-68.
60. Id. at 795.
61. Supra note 8.
62. 401 U.S. at 755.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1970 ed.). See supra note 45 et seq.
64. "It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color
of law to intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to
the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception." Id. § 2511-2(c) (1970 ed.).
But other questions about the constitutionality of Title III after Katz and Berger v.
New York, supra note 35, remain. See Linzer, Federal Procedure For Court Or-
dered Electronic Surveillance: Does It Meet the Standards of Berger and Katz,
60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 203 (1969); Schwartz, Legitimation of Electronic
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present state laws permitting electronic eavesdropping, since it has lim-
ited rather than broadened the fourth amendment application in such
circumstances.65
But Katz raised many questions, and White has answered only one.
The future decisions of the Court in the area of electronic surveillance
will undoubtedly attempt to resolve some of the other uncertainties en-
gendered by Katz. For example, where the factor of consent is not
present, and neither party works with the police, under what circum-
stances the parties to a conversation have justifiably expected their words
to remain private must still be developed satisfactorily.06  Problems con-
cerning the adaptability of a warrant to a situation where conversation
is sought to be seized, especially those relating to the degree of partic-
ularity required and the duration of the warrant's issue, are still to be
completely resolved after Katz and Berger v. New York.67 Future de-
cisions will also have to cope with a question expressly reserved by the
majority opinion in Katz, i.e., "[w]hether safeguards other than prior
authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in
a situation involving the national security. . ...68
Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MicH. L. REV. 455 (1969);
Weinstein, Court Order System of Regulating Electronic Eavesdropping Under
State Enabling Legislation, 2 CONN. L. REV. 250 (1969); Comment, Electronic
Surveillance: The New Standards, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 49 (1968); Comment,
Electronic Surveillance by Law Enforcement Officers, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 63
(1969); Comment, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance-Title Ill of the
Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 RUTGERS L. REV. 319 (1969); Comment, Eaves-
dropping Provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968:
How Do They Stand in Light of Recent Supreme Court Decisions?, :3 VAL. U.L.
REV. 89 (1968).
65. For a survey of state legislation governing electronic eavesdropping see
Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 207-211 and accompanying footnotes; but see Wein-
stein, supra note 64, at 250 n. 4, for a list of states which amended their statutes
as of August 1969. For discussions on the effect of Berger and Katz on specific
state legislation see Michael, Electronic Surveillance in Illinois, 1 LOYOLA U.
OF CHICAGO L.J. 33 (1970); Comment, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping in Arizona:
A Legislative and Constitutional Analysis, 9 ARiz L. REV. 452 (1968); Comment,
Electronic Surveillance in California: A Study in State Legislative Control, 57
CALIF. L. REV. 1182 (1969); Comment, Georgia Eavesdropping Statute: A Critical
Examination in Light of Berger v. New York, 2 GA. L. REV. 594 (1968).
66. See Kitch, supra note 9, at 139-40.
67. Supra note 35. See articles cited supra note 64. See also Pitler, Eaves-
dropping and Wiretapping-The Aftermath of Katz and Kaiser: A Comment, 34
BROOKLYN L. REV. 223 (1968); Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the
Magistrate: The Case in Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (1969); Comment,
Electronic Eavesdropping Under the Fourth Amendment-After Berger and Katz,
17 BUFFALO L. REV. 455 (1968); Comment, Fourth Amendment and Electronic
Eavesdropping: Katz v. United States, 5 HOUSTON L. REV. 990 (1968).
68. 389 U.S. at 358 n. 23.
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White has perhaps done more, however, than merely tie one of Katz's
loose ends. Although the decision has been logically and legally recon-
ciled with the Katz opinion, the major step taken by the Court in Katz
indicated that a majority of the Court was coming to believe that most, if
not all, electronic eavesdropping should at least be limited by a warrant
requirement. White abruptly halted any such notions. A consideration
of the change in membership on the Court should provide a practical
clue as to the reason for the Court's failure to extend the principles ex-
pressed in Katz, and may portend the tenor of the Court's approach in
resolving the quagmire yet remaining in the area of electronic surveil-
lance.09
JOSEPH BISCEGLIA
69. Of the seven Justices who concurred in the Katz decision, two, Justice
Fortas and Chief Justice Warren, have since left. The two new Justices, Black-
mun and Chief Justice Burger, notably joined in the plurality opinion in White
and refused to extend the principles of Katz.
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